. In addition, many states also require principal candidates to pass a standardized licensure exam before they are licensed to work as a public school principal or assistant principal. The most common of these exams is the School Leaders Licensure Assessment (SLLA), administered by Educational Testing Service (ETS).
The SLLA is designed to measure whether principal job candidates possess the knowledge and/or skills necessary to perform school administration tasks competently in their initial years of school leadership (ETS, 2009; Tannenbaum & Robustelli, 2008) . In its current format, the SLLA is a 4-hour computer-based standardized exam whose content is aligned with the Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium (ISLLC) leadership standards (ETS, n.d.-b; Tannenbaum & Robustelli, 2008) . As of 2016, 18 states, the District of Columbia, and two territories require principal candidates to obtain some minimum score as a condition of becoming a school leader (ETS, n.d.-a) .
Despite this widespread use of the assessment among states, the properties of the SLLA have not received much research attention. In particular, we know little about the distribution of scores across different groups of test takers or about the usefulness of SLLA scores for identifying and hiring leaders who are likely to be successful as principals once entering the principalship. The distributional question is important given evidence from teacher licensure exams and standardized exams in other professions of different score distributions or passage rates by such testtaker characteristics as race, ethnicity, and gender (Angrist & Guryan, 2008; Anrig, Goertz, & McNeil, 1986; Esmail & Roberts, 2013; Fernandez, Studnek, & Margolis, 2008; Garcia, 1986; Gitomer, Latham, & Ziomek, 1999; Nettles, Scatton, Steinberg, & Tyler, 2011; Wightman, 1998) . Non-White and female educators are, and historically have been, underrepresented in school leadership (Bitterman, Goldring, & Gray, 2013; Riehl & Byrd, 1997) . Although possible inequitable access to school leadership positions by both race/ethnicity and gender raises basic fairness concerns, underrepresentation among non-White educators is particularly concerning in light of evidence on the positive impacts of school leadership diversity on outcomes for an increasingly diverse population of students and teachers (see Grissom & Keiser, 2011; Grissom, Rodriguez, & Kern, in press; Irvine, 1988; Lomotey & Lowery, 2014 ). An examination of whether differential licensure examination performance might contribute to this underrepresentation thus has relevance for policymakers seeking to diversify the school leadership workforce.
The usefulness question speaks to the presumed goals of including a professional examination as a component of entering a new occupation, which typically are either to screen out candidates who are unlikely to be effective (while, conversely, allowing effective practitioners to be licensed) or to provide prospective principals with a score that signals how effective they are likely to be, especially in their first few years in a school leadership position (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . If empirically the test serves no practical screening or signaling function, then not only is the utility of the test called into question, but concerns about possible inequities in scores-or, especially, passage rates-by immutable test-taker characteristics would be redoubled. On the other hand, if the test is successful in screening candidates or signaling performance, states may consider policy strategies such as raising minimum cut scores or reporting scores to districts seeking to hire principals as means to increase the quality of the principal workforce.
This study addresses these questions using unique data on all SLLA test takers in Tennessee over approximately a 10-year period, which we link to administrative records on principals, schools, and students. To be specific, we use these data to answer three questions. First, how are scores distributed by prospective principal characteristics and the schools in which they work, and how do those characteristics predict the probability of failing to meet Tennessee's cut score to be eligible for licensure? Second, to what extent do SLLA scores predict school leader labor market outcomes, including future hiring as an assistant principal or principal and principal turnover? Third, does SLLA "failure" screen less effective principals, and to what degree do SLLA scores signal future job performance of principal candidates? Based on our answers to these questions, we also assess how increasing Tennessee's cut score to the higher scores of nearby states would, given the current distribution of scores, likely affect the composition of licensed principal workforce and overall principal job performance.
Of course, linking SLLA performance to job performance only makes sense if valid measures of principal job performance exist. Given the difficulties researchers have documented in creating valid measures of principal performance (e.g., Chiang, Lipscomb, & Gill, 2012; Condon & Clifford, 2012; Grissom, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2015) , we eschew reliance on any single measure. Instead, we test for associations between SLLA scores and a variety of potential performance metrics gathered from statewide evaluation, teacher survey, and administrative data, which allows for more nuanced findings regarding potential associations between SLLA scores and some areas of principal effectiveness but not others.
The next section provides background on principal licensure requirements and the SLLA. We then discuss the potential screening and signaling functions of the SLLA and other licensure exams. Next, we describe our data and methodological approaches before reporting our results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for use of the SLLA to improve principal quality and the consistency of its usage with the goals of increasing diversity in the principal workforce.
Background on Principal Licensure Requirements
All states require public school principals to hold a school administration license (Kaye & Makos, 2012; Roberts, 2009) . 1 Although there are some differences in licensure requirements, states typically require a valid teaching license; multiple years of teaching experience in the K-12 setting; the completion of a state-approved school administrator preparation program, usually provided by a college or university; and a master's degree (or higher) in school administration or related field (Kaye & Makos, 2012; Zimmerman, 2002) . Other requirements that some states impose include a residency requirement, a practicum as a principal, or work experience as an assistant principal (Kaye & Makos, 2012) . States also increasingly require principal candidates to pass a standardized assessment that tests their knowledge of school administration or educational leadership topics (Roberts, 2009) . These assessments aim to raise the caliber of principal candidates entering the profession by ensuring a minimum standard for what school leaders need to know (Latham & Pearlman, 1999; Tannenbaum, 1999) . As of 2011-2012, at least 30 states required such an exam for initial licensure.
2 Among them, 17 states currently require candidates to take the SLLA, for which each state sets their own minimum qualifying score (ETS, n.d.-a) . Other states use other standardized assessments or their own assessments. For example, in Texas, principal candidates must pass the Principal TExES administered by ETS to be certified as principal (Texas Education Agency, 2016) . In New York, candidates need to pass the New York State Teacher Certification Examination Program assessments for school building leaders (New York State Education Department, 2013) .
In Tennessee, which is the focus of our study, principal candidates are required to complete a state-approved school administrator preparation program, hold a valid Tennessee educator license, and have at least three years of education work experience to be licensed in school administration. In addition, they must score at or above 160 on the SLLA (Tennessee Department of Education [TDOE] , n.d.-a). This cut score is the lowest in the United States (tied with Kentucky); cut scores across states range from 160 to 169 (ETS, n.d.-a).
The SLLA
The foundation of the SLLA is the ISLLC standards, which aim to define strong school leadership for use in leadership training, licensure, and principal evaluation (Council of Chief State School Officers [CCSSO], 1996 [CCSSO], , 2008 Murphy & Shipman, 1999) . The ISLLC standards are comprised of six domains, spanning school vision, school culture, learning environment, collaboration with the faculty and community members, ethics, and understanding of the school context (CCSSO, 2008) . ISLLC states contracted with ETS to develop the SLLA as a tool for ensuring that new leaders were prepared for leadership work in the standards' areas (Latham & Pearlman, 1999) . The first version, SLLA Form 1010, was developed in 1999. It was a 6-hour, paper-based assessment with 25 constructed-response questions in four domains. The second version, SLLA Form 1011, replaced the earlier version in 2009, and was further succeeded by the 6011 version in 2011. This last version covers similar content to the 1011 version but is computer based.
SLLA Form 6011 is a 4-hour standardized exam and is comprised of two sections covering the following six domains that correspond to the ISLLC leadership domains: vision and goals, teaching and learning, managing organizational systems and safety, collaborating with key stakeholders, ethics and integrity, and the education system. The first section asks 100 multiple-choice questions, and the second section asks seven constructed-response questions (ETS, n.d.-b). The score ranges from 100 to 200, and ETS recommends a score of 163 points as a passing score (ETS, 2009) . Among participating states and Washington, D.C., five states set their passing scores higher than 163 points, with Mississippi requiring the highest score of 169 points. The SLLA is designed to measure whether principal candidates possess knowledge and skills necessary to perform job responsibilities expected of beginning principals effectively (Reese & Tannenbaum, 1999; Tannenbaum & Robustelli, 2008) . With this aim in mind, the content of the questions was based on a national job analysis of beginning school principals. The job analysis collected information on knowledge and skills necessary for satisfactory performance among novice school leaders through a series of meetings with experts and current principals and a review of the literature. ETS ensured content validity of the assessment by establishing a link between the ISLLC standards and the scope of knowledge and skills defined by the job analysis (Tannenbaum, 1999; Tannenbaum & Robustelli, 2008) .The evaluation of principal responses also is guided by the ISLLC standards (Latham & Pearlman, 1999; Reese & Tannenbaum, 1999; Tannenbaum, 1999) .
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Screening and Signaling Value of the SLLA For policymakers, principal licensure examination requirements have two goals. First, by setting a minimum qualifying score or a cut score, states can specify a minimum level of knowledge and skills that principal candidates should possess to be licensed in school administration, excluding from the candidate pool individuals not meeting this minimum requirement. This function is called screening (Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . Second, among those surpassing the qualifying score, licensure scores can be used as an indicator of future principal job performance, especially in the first few years in the profession before substantial on-the-job experience might build (or supplant) the knowledge and skills measured by the exam. This function is called signaling (Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) , which is closely related to the idea of predictive validity-that is, the scores predict later performance outcomes. If exam scores are a useful performance signal, policymakers or district leaders might use them for human resource decisions, such as making hiring decisions, setting initial salary, or placing effective principals in schools where they are needed most.
The hypothesis that the SLLA will predict future job performance relies on at least three expectations, and the failure of any of them could negate such a relationship. First, we have to expect that the SLLA is pegged to standards that are preconditions for good job performancethat is, the standards indeed describe the skills and competencies that effective principals require. The ISLLC standards were based on prior research that examined the linkages between educational leadership and school and student outcomes, changes in student demographics (e.g., race, poverty, language, and culture), and the societal shift toward market-based solutions to social needs (CCSSO, 1996 (CCSSO, , 2008 . Critics contend, however, that this research was often limited in scientific or empirical rigor and lacking in specific or operational guidance for principals to use the standards for action (Achilles & Price, 2001; English, 2000) . Studies have not examined the relationship between principals' ratings on these standards and school and student outcomes, with the exception of one descriptive study that found evidence of positive correlations (Kaplan, Owings, & Nunnery, 2005 ). An experimental evaluation of a multiyear professional development program for principals covering content similar to content emphasized by the ISLLC standards found no impact on measures of school climate or student achievement (Jacob, Goddard, Kim, Miller, & Goddard, 2014) .
Second, we have to expect that the knowledge and skills the SLLA measures lead to leadership behaviors that are effective. That is, the test purports to measure knowledge and skills, not whether the candidates can or will apply them in leadership action. If the connection between knowledge and skills and effective behaviors is weak, even very knowledgeable (or skilled) principals may show no better leadership performance in practice.
Third, we have to expect that the SLLA is itself a valid and reliable tool for measuring these knowledge and skills. A test that does not appropriately capture the underlying leadership knowledge and skill constructs is unlikely to correlate with future performance. Unfortunately, published research on the psychometric properties of the SLLA is limited (Tannenbaum, 1999; Tannenbaum & Robustelli, 2008) , making construct validity and reliability difficult to assess.
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Even if the SLLA predicts future principal job performance, however, the likelihood that it correlates with measures of future job performance rests on a fourth expectation, which is that valid and reliable measures of principal job performance are available. This expectation is not a trivial one. In the past, few such measures have existed (Reese & Tannenbaum, 1999) , and even now, the properties of many measures of principal performance used by researchers and policymakers are understudied. For example, many empirical studies have utilized student or school achievement scores as performance measures (e.g., Hallinger & Heck, 1998; Robinson, Lloyd, & Rowe, 2008) , but research has documented the difficulties inherent in attributing test score changes to principals (Grissom et al., 2015) . Similarly, the reliability and validity of subjective ratings of principal performance from supervisors or teachers increasingly utilized in principal evaluation systems have received only limited attention (Grissom, Blissett, & Mitani, 2016) .
Poor predictive validity of the SLLA would undermine its capacity to successfully screen principal candidates. If the SLLA has only weak power to differentiate future high and low performers, a cutoff score requirement may result in many false negatives and false positives (Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . In other words, the licensure system would reject principal candidates who could perform well as school leaders (false negatives) and permit candidates who turn out to be ineffective school leaders (false positives). False negatives are particularly problematic if they are unequally distributed across subgroups of candidates. For example, if racial or ethnic minority candidates tend not to perform well on the exam for reasons unrelated to their potential skills as principals, resulting in disproportionately high failure rates, the SLLA becomes a significant barrier for policymakers seeking to increase demographic diversity in the school leadership population and contributes to inequitable access to school leadership positions for historically disadvantaged populations. In addition, the existence of false positives potentially reduces the overall quality of the principal workforce by allowing less effective candidates to lead schools. These concerns motivate our investigation of the relationships among SLLA scores, test taker and school characteristics, and future job performance of principal candidates.
Prior Research on the SLLA
Current school leadership research provides little insight into how SLLA scores are distributed or the extent to which they are associated with later principal or school outcomes. Most of the prior studies of the SLLA have focused on how SLLA scores are associated with principal candidates' course grades or internship performance during their graduate studies in school administration, or have examined whether the assessment's short vignette questions are valid in terms of differentiating individuals trained in school administration preparation programs from those with little background in education (Bryant, Isernhagen, LeTendre, & Neu, 2003; Kelly, 2013; Kelly & Koonce, 2012; Koonce & Kelly, 2013) . For example, Kelly and Koonce (2012) explored correlations between the SLLA scores and cumulative grade point averages (GPA) of graduate students in educational leadership programs as well as their internship performance ratings, assigned by mentors. They found a weak positive correlation between student GPA and SLLA scores but no correlation with internship performance ratings.
One Given limited evidence on principal licensure exams, the best available evidence regarding the likelihood that they predict other outcomes may come from study of tests used for teacher licensures, such as the Praxis examinations. These studies generally have found that teacher licensure exams are somewhat effective in weeding out less competent teacher candidates (Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . However, the exams appear to be at best weakly associated with future teacher job performance (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006 D'Agostino & Powers, 2009; Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . The nature of a teacher's work, the licensure exams themselves, and the measures of job performance all differ from the principal context, necessitating a closer look at preservice testing for principals.
The connections between SLLA scores and principal labor market outcomes are similarly unexplored, though there are reasons to hypothesize that these connections exist. For example, we might expect that SLLA scores predict the likelihood that a candidate is hired as a principal or assistant principal if districts view a candidate's score as an important signal, either of useful skills or competencies the test purports to measure or of some other trait, such as general intelligence or capacity for leadership. Even if districts do not know the scores themselves-and typically they would not, unless the candidate self-reported, because scores are reported to states rather than districts-they could be correlated with competencies or traits the districts value that will be reflected in the interview or other aspect of the hiring process. Once a candidate becomes a principal, we might also expect SLLA scores to be associated with turnover probabilities. Given evidence that more effective principals are less likely to leave their positions, for example, we hypothesize that high scorers have lower propensities for turnover than principals with lower SLLA scores. Because of the value of leadership stability for school performance and improvement (Béteille, Kalogrides, & Loeb, 2012; Hargreaves & Fink, 2004; Hargreaves, Moore, Fink, Brayman, & White, 2003; Miller, 2013) , if SLLA scores indeed predict future principal turnover or retention, they conceivably could have value to districts in making strategic human resource decisions-for example, around principal placement-even if they did not provide a strong signal about future job performance.
Data and Measures
Our analysis uses data on complete SLLA score histories-that is, all test scores, even nonpassing scores or retakes-for any person taking the test as a condition of licensure to work in Tennessee between 2003 (the first year the test was required) and 2013, provided by ETS. The total number of test scores, which includes anyone taking the test at a Tennessee testing center or who requested their score be reported to the TDOE, is 8,589. The data also include information about which school leader preparation program test takers completed (or currently attend) as part of the state's licensure requirements, which we utilize in some analyses.
We matched score histories to longitudinal administrative data files on all public education personnel from the 2003-2004 to 2013-2014 school years, provided by TDOE via the Tennessee Education Research Alliance at Vanderbilt University. 6 In matching, we identified 7,951 test scores for 7,633 individuals with a valid Tennessee educator licensure record. 7 The administrative files provide rich information about test takers' personal and professional characteristics, including job positions, gender, race and ethnicity, age, years of experience, and highest degree earned. We used these data files to construct additional experience measures, such as years of experience as a principal in Tennessee (for those observed entering new principal positions after 2003-2004, top-coded otherwise) and years employed in their current school. We merged these data with information on the characteristics of the schools and districts in which the test takers currently work from annual student demographic and enrollment data files from TDOE and the National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of Data files.
Measuring Principal Job Performance
Measures of principal job performance data come from multiple sources. First, TDOE provided us with principal evaluation information from the Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM) for the 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 school years. TEAM is the statewide educator evaluation system that TDOE created as part of its Race to the Top education reforms. For principals, TEAM evaluations are comprised of two portions, with each accounting for 50% of the final evaluation score. The first portion comes from supervisor ratings of principal performance on a rubric derived from the Tennessee Instructional Leadership Standards. 8 As of 2013-2014, the rubric defines principal leadership across 22 items in seven domains, such as Instructional Leadership and Culture for Teaching and Learning. Principal ratings are based on formal observations typically conducted by the principal's supervisor, the superintendent, or another central office leader. Because not all principals received midyear observations in the initial years of TEAM implementation, we use the end-ofyear summative rating for all principals. In other work, we show that principals' scores across the 22 items are so highly intercorrelated that they can be reduced to a single underlying performance score using factor analysis (Grissom et al., 2016) . In this analysis, we use the predicted score from this factor model as the TEAM subjective rating (the average across items is correlated with the factor score at 0.97). Because the items included in the TEAM rubric varied somewhat across years, we analyze the data on these subjective ratings separately by year; however, because factor analysis shows a single performance factor, we also show results pooling across years. These subjective rating scores are referred to as "TEAM scores" for the remainder of this article. Note that assistant principals similarly were rated summatively by their building principals using essentially the same rubric in the same years. We utilize parallel factor-analyzed scores for assistant principals in some analyses.
The second portion comes from student achievement measures, including 35% from school-level value-added scores calculated via the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS; the other 15% is an achievement measure mutually agreed upon by the principal and rater, which we do not include here given that it can vary from person to person). , TDOE provided us with composite school-level value-added scores from TVAAS, which combine performance across all tested classrooms, subjects, and tests (e.g., endof-course exams, SAT-10). Although not clearly an accurate measure of principal performance (Grissom et al., 2015) , we make use of TVAAS scores because of the emphasis given to them as a performance measure in the state evaluation and accountability systems.
To supplement our analysis of TVAAS, we also test for associations with student-level growth from models we run using TDOEprovided data on student demographics, enrollment, and achievement on the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program (TCAP) for students from 2007-2008 to 2013-2014 . TCAP is a timed, multiple-choice assessment and is designed to measure skills in reading, language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies (TDOE, n.d.-b) . We use test scores in reading and mathematics for Grades 3 through 8. A school identifier permitted student data to be matched to schools and principals. 9 TDOE also provided responses to the school leadership module on a statewide 2012-2013 survey of Tennessee teachers: the Teaching, Empowering, Leading, and Learning (TELL) survey. This module includes a series of approximately 20 questions that assess perspectives of teachers, assistant principals, and principals on their school's leadership. 10 Items ask, for example, whether the school's leadership consistently supports teachers, whether teachers are recognized for their accomplishments, and whether leaders make an effort to address teachers' concerns. We use responses by respondent type (e.g., teacher, assistant principal) to measure the quality of the school's leadership.
11 Using factor analysis conducted separately by respondent type (e.g., teacher, assistant principal), we again found that responses measured one underlying latent construct, which we take to be perception of leadership effectiveness.
12 Respondent-level factor scores were averaged at the school level by respondent. 13 Finally, we create a binary principal turnover variable from the longitudinal administrative data files. It takes a value of 1 if a principal leaves his or her current district (or the principalship altogether) in year t + 1, and 0 otherwise. Note that this variable does not distinguish turnover decisions made by the principal from those made by the school district.
Method
Our analysis consists of three parts: an analysis of the distribution of SLLA scores and failure rates, an analysis of the association between SLLA score and principal hiring and turnover, and an analysis of the SLLA as a performance screen or signal. We describe each in turn.
Analysis of Distribution of Test Scores and Test Failure
The first part explores what characteristics are associated with SLLA scores and failure rates. Prior to the 2009-2010 school year, the cut score in Tennessee was 156. In the 2009-2010 school year, a new form of the SLLA test (SLLA Form 1011) was instituted, and the cut score was raised to 160. The cut score remained the same when TDOE switched to SLLA Form 6011 in the 2011-2012 school year. We use these cut scores to create a binary passage/failure indicator for each test observation.
We begin by describing scores and passage rates overall and by different principal candidate and school characteristics using t tests. The idea is to assess whether scores and pass rates vary according to personal characteristics of the test takers and, given the likelihood that they will become principals in schools similar to the ones in which they have worked previously (Bastian & Henry, 2015) , the schools in which they are currently employed, typically as teachers. We then model the probability of failure as a function of principal candidates' characteristics, school characteristics, district characteristics, and year effects, plus administrator preparation program fixed effects and region fixed effects defined by TDOE's eight geographic support regions (e.g., Northwest, South Central).
14 Models are estimated using logistic regression. More formally, for example, for failure we estimate the following logistic regression model:
where
+τ s +ε ist . The probability that a principal candidate i (who may take the test more than once) in school s in year t fails is a function of candidate characteristics X ist (gender, age, non-White status, total years of experience as educator in the state of Tennessee, and education specialist or doctoral degree), school characteristics S st at the time of the test administration (locale type, percent of students eligible for the federal free/ reduced lunch program, percent of Black students, percent of Hispanic students, school level, and school enrollment size), a similar set of district characteristics D st , year fixed effects θ t , and a random error term ε ist , and, in some models, administrator preparation program indicators δ i and/or region indicators τ s . We include administration preparation program indicators to control for differences in the selectivity and quality of the programs, which can vary substantially (e.g., Levine, 2005; Murphy, 2007) . Region effects control for region-specific differences in test scores that may arise from differences in labor markets or other factors that may attract different kinds of candidates to the principalship.
School Leader Hiring and Turnover
The second part of our analysis explores the extent to which SLLA scores predict school leader labor market outcomes, namely candidates' future hiring as a school leader and turnover among current principals. For hiring, because principal candidates need to meet multiple licensure requirements in addition to passing the exam, we limit our analytic sample to principal candidates who have successfully obtained a license in school administration. Note that not all licensed candidates are on the market for such a position, so any estimated association between SLLA score and hiring will not separate the propensity for candidates with different scores to seek leadership positions at different rates from the likelihood that higher or lower scoring candidates are hired after applying.
We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate time to hire. 15 A hazard model is appropriate here because of the censored nature of the dependent variable. More formally, we estimate the following hazard model:
The hazard rate that a licensed principal candidate i in school s is hired as a principal in year t + 1 is a function of the baseline hazard λ 0 (t), SLLA test score TEST i , candidate characteristics X ist , school characteristics S is , region fixed effects τ s , and a random error term ε ist . Vectors X and S contain the same variables as in the failure analysis above. We further stratify by school district to take into account district-level differences in hiring probabilities. We cluster standard errors at the candidate level.
One of the key assumptions of a Cox proportional hazard model is the proportionality assumption. We test this assumption for each covariate by examining Schoenfeld residuals (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001; Keele, 2010; Klein & Moeschberger, 2003) . When a covariate violates the proportionality assumption, we interact it with time in logarithmic form to address this violation.
To test for nonlinear associations between SLLA scores and hiring, we insert different forms of the SLLA scores (e.g., quadratic, categorical across different score ranges). We also estimate the similar hazard models for alternative outcomes, replacing time to first principal job with time to becoming (a) an assistant principal or (b) any school administrator (i.e., either principal or assistant principal).
Our analysis of turnover estimates a similar Cox proportional hazards model of Equation 2, except that the outcome is time to leaving the district (equation omitted for brevity). The sample is all principals we observe entering the principalship during the time period of the data. Time to exit (hazard rate) is modeled as a function of SLLA score, school characteristics, principal characteristics, and a random error term. As in the hiring analysis, we test the proportionality assumption and include an interaction with time for variables that may be in violation. In addition, we stratify the model by school district to account for unobserved district-specific factors that may affect turnover, such as district working conditions or local alternative employment opportunities. We also test for nonlinearities between SLLA score and turnover by inserting different forms of the score variable, as described above for the hiring analysis.
Screening and Signaling Analyses
The last group of analyses includes only working principals. It examines the two functions of testing polices: screening of weak principal candidates from the candidate pool and signaling of future job performance. The screening analysis focuses on whether passing a cut score set by the state differentiates between those who pass and those who fail in terms of their future job performance. The signaling analysis assesses whether-conditional on passing the screen-higher SLLA test scores are associated with better job performance, particularly within the first few years of a school leadership career.
Screening. Obviously, a central challenge for an analysis of screening is a classic selection problem: We cannot observe the job performance of a principal candidate if he or she fails the exam and thus never becomes licensed to be a school principal. To address this problem, we take advantage of the arbitrary nature of states' chosen cut scores and implement three approaches similar to those in Goldhaber's (2007) analysis of the screening value of teacher licensure testing. For these analyses, we limit the sample to the Form 1010 test takers from the time period prior to 2009 when-we will show later-the very low cut score employed in Tennessee (156) meant that only about 1% of test takers failed. First, we compare the future performance of those who passed under the pre-2009 cut score of 156 but would have failed had the post-2009 cut score of 160 been in place to those who would have passed under either cut score. Second, we compare the future performance of those who passed under the pre-2009 cut score of 156 but would have failed had Tennessee implemented ETS's post-2009 recommended cut score of 163 (a cut score employed in at least two neighboring states) to those who scored 163 or higher. In a final analysis, we set a hypothetical cut score at 169, the highest cut score currently used by any state in the United States (Mississippi) to assess whether the SLLA's screening capacity might be different at a much higher cut point. 16 The idea behind each of these analyses is that, if the SLLA is an effective screening tool at any of these three cut score choices, Tennessee principals scoring below the cut score should have lower performance, on average, than those scoring above it. This evidence, however, must be interpreted with appropriate caution, given that we do not in fact observe outcomes for a small number of principals in the far left tail of the distribution who would serve as the most appropriate counterfactual for Tennessee's actual chosen cut score.
The screening model estimates principal job outcomes as a function of the various indicators for passage or failure, plus school controls. Note that other principal characteristics are not included in these models because the licensure policy screens principal candidates based solely on test performance and does not consider any other indicators of leadership ability (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . The model takes the following form:
in which job performance Y (i.e., TEAM, TVAAS, and TELL) of a principal i at school s is a function of Pass i , an indicator for scoring at or above the SLLA cut score (i.e., 160, 163, or 169); school characteristics S is (school enrollment size, percent of female students, percent of non-White students, percent of students eligible for the federal free/reduced lunch program, percent of students whose first language is not English, percent of immigrant students, percent of intellectually gifted students, percent of students with disabilities, mean attendance rate, locale type, and school level); district characteristics D st (district enrollment size in natural log form, percent of students eligible for the federal free/reduced lunch program, percent of non-White students, district enrollment size, locale code); region effects τ s ; and a random error term ε is . For TEAM scores, given changes in the rubric across years, we estimate models separately for 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and 2013-2014 , plus an additional model pooling all 3 years. For TELL, models are limited to a single year of data (2012) (2013) . TVAAS models combine 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 . For models that pool across years, we add year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the school level. For cross-sectional models, we cluster standard errors at the district level.
We also estimate screening models using student-level TCAP test scores from Grades 3 to 8 in math and reading.
17 These models include all of the variables included in Equation 3 and add student-level control variables (including lagged test scores), year fixed effects, and grade fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the following growth model: 
That is, the TCAP score in subject j (either math or reading) for student i in grade g in school s in year t (A ijgst ) is a function of prior achievement in the same subject A ijgst same subj −1 _ , prior achievement in the other subject A ijgst other subj −1 _ , SLLA passage indicator Pass st , student characteristics X ijst (gender, age in months, Black, Hispanic, eligible for the free lunch program, eligible for the reduced lunch program, not native English speaker, immigrant status, gifted, disability, and attendance rate), the same characteristic vectors for schools and districts (S st and D st ) detailed above, region effects τ s , grade fixed effects ρ g , year fixed effects θ t , and a random error term ε ijst . We also check for nonlinearities by using different forms of SLLA scores (e.g., quadratic). We cluster standard errors at the school level.
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Signaling. The signaling analysis does not limit the sample to principals taking the SLLA prior to 2009 (Form 1010). Instead, to increase power, we standardize SLLA scores within test form (i.e., 1010, 1011, 6011) and combine across all years for which we have scores. Otherwise, the setup for the signaling analysis is similar to the screening analysis, except that we substitute the standardized SLLA score for the passage indicator and add principal characteristics to the models. The parallel regression model to Equation 2 for the TEAM, TVAAS, and TELL outcomes is as follows: 
where Test indicates the standardized SLLA score of principal i, P contains principal characteristics (gender, age, highest degree, Black or Hispanic minority status, total years of experience as educator in the state of Tennessee, indicators for years of experience as a principal), and other variables are as described above. We also test for nonlinearities by estimating different forms of the SLLA scores (e.g., quadratic, categorical across different score ranges).
We also estimate a student-level achievement model similar to Equation 4 that replaces the passage indicator with the standardized SLLA score and adds principal characteristics (equation omitted for brevity). As with the screening analysis, for signaling models that pool across years, we add year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the school level. For cross-sectional models, we cluster standard errors at the district level.
Additional Sources of Bias. In addition to the selection problem faced in the screening analysis, there are two potential sources of bias facing our screening and signaling models. A first potential source of bias is nonrandom sorting of principals into schools (Goldhaber, 2007; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . It is likely that principals have preferences for working in more advantaged schools, and their sorting patterns tend to reflect these preferences (e.g., Baker, Punswick, & Belt, 2010; Gates et al., 2006; Loeb, Kalogrides, & Horng, 2010) . If high-scoring principals are more likely to sort in this way, perhaps because the skills measured by the SLLA afford them greater sorting opportunities, estimates of the association between scores and outcomes may be affected. To help mitigate this bias, we estimate alternatives to the main screening and signaling models that drop the district characteristics and region fixed effects in favor of district fixed effects. District fixed effects control for district-level factors that may influence sorting, but their inclusion sacrifices substantial degrees of freedom relative to the sample sizes for some of the analyses, and is an incomplete adjustment if sorting across schools within districts is important. Results, which are very similar to those shown in the main text, are provided in the Appendix (available in the online version of the journal).
A second potential source of bias comes from nonrandom attrition of principals. If ineffective principals are more likely to exit early in their careers, our models may overestimate the predictive power of SLLA scores. We address this potential problem by limiting our analytic samples to principals with less than 3 years of experience within the Tennessee system for our preferred screening and signaling models. We also check the robustness of our findings by limiting to only first-year principals and expanding to all principals with SLLA scores. Results from these models are presented in the Appendix (available in the online version of the journal) as well and are consistent with the results shown in the main text.
Patterns in SLLA Scores and Failure Rates
We first descriptively examine the personal characteristics of personnel who took the SLLA between the 2003-2004 and 2013-2014 school years. 19 The top part of Table 1 reports that seventy percent of the test takers are women and less than one quarter are non-White. The average age is 38, and more than three quarters of the test takers hold at least a master's degree. Twenty percent hold an education specialist degree or doctoral degree. The average test taker has 9.4 years of experience in Tennessee schools. Table 2 displays the number of test takers matched to Tennessee personnel data by SLLA type, the number of test takers whose scores were below a minimum qualifying score (i. The number of failures and the failure rates substantially increased when SLLA Form 1011 was introduced and the minimum qualifying score was raised simultaneously to 160. Prior to these changes, the failure rate was never above 4% in any year and was as low as 0.6% in [2008] [2009] . Of the 4,104 tests taken in this period, only 57 were below the cutoff, a failure rate of 1.4%. This very low failure rate means that very few potential principals are missing in the screening analysis below, limiting the impact of selection bias. When the form and cut score changed in the 2009-2010 school year, the failure rate rose to 17%, the highest rate in any year. In subsequent years, it declined somewhat and was approximately 10% in 2012-2013. The average failure rate in the later period is 14.2%. Figure 1 displays the score distribution by test type. Although the spread of the test scores is similar between Forms 1010 and 1011/6011, the average test score is clearly higher for the older version (174.9) than the newer versions (170.3), suggesting that the test became more difficult with the version change. 20 Both the decline in the average test score and the increase in the minimum qualifying score appear to have contributed to the substantial increase in the failure rate. -2012, 2012-2013, or 2013-2014 . If a principal was in the system for multiple of these years, we report values from the latest year. SLLA = School Leaders Licensure Assessment. Table 3 reports SLLA scores and the proportion of test takers who failed by their personal and school characteristics at the time they took the test. 21 We pool scores across test types. One important pattern is that non-White test takers score significantly lower than their White counterparts and thus are much less likely to pass the test. Fifteen percent of non-White test takers, including multiple test takers, failed the test across years, whereas only 5% of White test takers did so. Although not reported in Table 3 , we also examined whether or not test takers passed the exam on their first try by their characteristics. We observed the same patterns: Only 80% of non-White test takers pass the exam on their first try, whereas 93% of White test takers do so.
We also found differences in scores and failure rates by gender, age, locale type, and schools' demographic characteristics. In particular, female test takers substantially outscore men and are much less likely to fail (6% vs. 10%, on average). Failure rates were also higher for test takers older than age 40 and those in urban schools but lower for those in schools with fewer Black students and students eligible for free or reduced price lunch.
The fact that Tennessee employs the lowest SLLA cut score for licensure in the United States permits analysis of raising the cut score on the characteristics of the licensed administrator candidate pool, given the current distribution of scores. Figure 2 shows the distribution of test scores for SLLA 1011/6011 by race. The dashed line is the distribution for White test takers and the solid line is for non-White test takers. The leftmost vertical line shows the state's current minimum qualifying score set at 160 points. The second vertical line indicates a score of 163 points, which is an ETS's recommended score and the one used by many states, including, as of 2014, neighboring states Missouri and Arkansas. The last vertical line displays the cut score used by Mississippi-also a neighbor of Tennessee-which sets its cut score at 169 points, the highest of any state. The figure shows that the score distribution for Whites is significantly to the right of that for non-Whites. As a result, raising the minimum qualifying score would fail more non-White test takers and substantially widen the racial gap in the failure rate. If the minimum qualifying score in Tennessee was raised to 163, the failure rate Even after controlling for numerous other factors, the main result from Table 3 holds: NonWhite test takers fail at substantially higher rates. In the most saturated model, on average, the odds that a non-White test taker fails the exam are approximately four times larger than the odds for their White counterparts. Adjusting for other variables, the predicted failure rate-calculated from column 5-for non-White test takers is 18%, compared with 6% for White test takers.
Other results from the bivariate analyses are similar in the multivariate context as well. In particular, female and younger test takers are less likely to fail. In addition, failure is more likely among test takers working in schools with larger numbers of Black and Hispanic students and in districts with larger numbers of low-income students.
School Leader Hiring
We now turn to whether SLLA scores are associated with time to future hiring as a school leader. We estimated a series of Cox proportional hazard models based on Equation 2 for personnel receiving administrator licenses. Because many principal candidates start their school administration careers as assistant principals, we also estimated the same models for being hired as assistant principals, and also for becoming any kind of school leader, that is, becoming either a principal or assistant principal. Table 5 reports the results for being hired as a principal (Models 1 and 2), as an assistant principal (Models 3 and 4), and as either kind of school administrator (Models 5 and 6), with coefficients shown as hazard ratios.
SLLA scores are positively associated with being hired as a school principal, as an assistant principal, and as a school administrator. 23 In each even-numbered model, the hazard ratio is greater than 1 at the 0.01 level (ranging from 1.3 to 1.4), suggesting that higher scorers are at substantially higher "risk" of being hired each year following licensure. We also find some evidence of nonlinearities in the association, with candidates scoring 169 or above generally showing much higher hazard ratios than lower scorers.
The SLLA as a Performance Screen
Next, we examine whether the SLLA serves as a performance screen for beginning principals. Here, our analytic sample changes from test takers (principal candidates) to current principals with SLLA scores. The bottom half of Table 1 reports characteristics of current principals. Just over half of the principals are female and the average age is 50. Only 18% of the principals are non-White. Because TDOE requires completion of a school administrator preparation program, which usually comes with a master's degree in school administration, almost all of the principals have at least a master's degree, and 44% of them have an education specialist degree or doctoral degree. Average years of principal experience in the sample is relatively short, with 54% of them being in their first 5 years, a function of the fact that our sample is limited to principals with SLLA scores, which have only been required for licensure since the 2003-2004 school year.
If the exam sifts principal candidates and fails only those with weak potential for high future performance, passing the exam should predict principals' job performance, and raising the minimum qualifying score should magnify the screening effects. Besides the current cut score of 160, we investigate 163 (ETS's recommended minimum) and 169 (the highest cut score currently employed by any state) as hypothetical minimum qualifying scores as well. We estimated three regression models with different qualifying score based on Equation 3 for each outcome for principals in the first 3 years of the principal career. Table 6 finds little evidence that the SLLA serves as an effective performance screen at any of the cut scores. For the TEAM models, in no case do those passing the hypothetical cut score receive significantly higher evaluation ratings, even when the three years of evaluation ratings are pooled, and in several cases, the coefficients are negative. Momentarily setting concerns about statistical power aside, taken at face value, Model 4 would suggest that test takers scoring at least 160 received subjective evaluation ratings nearly a third of a standard deviation higher in than those who scored lower in 2013, but the prior year scored 0.1 SD lower than that group. A similar inconsistency is evident for TELL, where, power aside, those passing through the three hypothetical screens are rated lower by teachers and assistant principals more often than they are rated higher. All three coefficients for the TVAAS models are negative. For TCAP, no coefficients are substantively meaningful, and in fact the coefficients in the reading models are all negative.
Because of the size of the standard errors in Table 6 , we caution against overinterpreting the pattern of null results. The 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for many of the estimates include potentially substantively meaningful values (see the Appendix Figure 1 for an illustration, available in the online version of the journal).
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Taking the 163 cut score as an example, the .13
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.00
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.12 (Continued) 95% CI for the pooled TEAM model ranges from [−0.22, 0 .40]; a true difference in TEAM rating between passers and nonpassers of 0.40 SD would be quite substantial, as would the 0.43 SD difference in TELL teacher survey ratings and 0.34 SD in TVAAS at the upper CI bounds of those estimates. 26 Thus, although the point estimates from these models generally are wrong-signed or positive but substantively small, statistical imprecision means that we cannot rule out the possibility that larger samples might show results more consistent with the expectation that the SLLA is an effective performance screen.
As a robustness check, we also estimated the same models for first-year principals and all principals and found similar results, with hypothetical SLLA passage associated with negative outcomes approximately as often as positive outcomes (see the Appendix Tables 1 and 2 , available in the online version of the journal). Appendix Table 3 (available in the online version of the journal) shows results for models substituting district fixed effects for district covariates. These models suggest that the 160 cut score is associated with higher TEAM ratings in 2012 but not in other years, and the pooled TEAM models show substantively trivial coefficients for all cut scores. TELL and TVAAS coefficients are all negative, as are five of the six TCAP coefficients. Again, little evidence is consistent with the idea that the SLLA is useful as a performance screen.
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The SLLA as a Signal of Future Job Performance Table 7 displays the signaling analysis results for principals in the first 3 years of their careers. 28 Positive coefficients indicate that, among those hired into principal positions, higher SLLA scores are associated with more positive measures of job performance.
For TEAM evaluations (Models 1 and 2), the SLLA coefficient is positive for 2 years and negative for the other; in all three cases, the coefficient is small, with a 1 SD increase in SLLA score associated with less than a 0.1 SD difference in TEAM subjective ratings. In the pooled model (Model 4), the correlation is similarly very small and not statistically different from zero.
Similarly, none of the SLLA coefficients in the three TELL models are statistically significant, and, in fact, all three are negative (Models 6-8). For TVAAS, the coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.05 level (β = −0.13). For TCAP, the coefficients are both precisely estimated zeros. In fact, 95% CIs on each coefficient in Table 7 generally suggest we can rule out substantively meaningful values (see the Appendix Figure 2 , available in the online version of the journal). In sum, the SLLA seems to have little signaling value in these models.
As a check on these results, we again estimated models for first-year principals only and for all principals (see the Appendix Table 4 , available in the online version of the journal). The patterns are similar to those shown in Table  7 . We also reestimated the main models with district fixed effects (see the Appendix Table 5 , available in the online version of the journal).
Here the pooled TEAM model shows some small evidence of signaling, with principals within the same district scoring 1 SD higher on the SLLA receiving TEAM ratings approximately 0.08 SD higher than average scorers in the same district. Yet the table also shows a negative and significant signal for TVAAS and negative (though statistically insignificant) signals for all three TELL ratings, as well as precise zeros for TCAP. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the findings in Table 7 . 29 Finding little evidence of a linear relationship between SLLA scores and a principal's later job performance, we also tested for possible nonlinear relationships, estimating models with (a) a quadratic term, (b) SLLA scores entered as indicators for quartiles, and (c) SLLA scores entered as indicator variables for being between 163 and 168 (that is, between the ETS recommended cut score and the high cut score set by Mississippi) and being above 169. Because the conclusions were similar across each of these approaches, we show only the results for (c). Results are shown in Table 8 ; results with district fixed effects are shown in the Appendix Table 5 (available in the online version of the journal). The findings are very similar to those in Table 7 and cast further doubt on the signaling value of the SLLA. Across principal outcomes, in no case is either of the higher test score groups statistically distinguishable from the lowest group, and often (e.g., 2012 TEAM evaluation ratings, the teacher TELL ratings) the signs for both indicator variables are negative, suggesting that, if anything, the lowest scoring SLLA group outperforms the higher scorers.
The SLLA and Assistant Principals' Job Performance
Our signaling and screening analyses so far have focused on beginning principals. Many principal candidates enter school leadership as assistant principals, however, and it is possible that the SLLA serves a screening or signaling function for these leaders. To investigate this possibility, we reestimated the same screening and signaling models for assistant principals' TEAM evaluation ratings for 2012, 2013, and 2014, plus a pooled model. TEAM evaluation ratings (assigned by building principals) are the only assistant principal-specific job performance measures available in the data. Note. SLLA scores are standardized and combined across test types (1010, 1011, 6011) . All dependent variables are standardized. Models 1 to 8 include principal characteristics, school characteristics, district characteristics, and region fixed effects. Models 4 and 5 include year fixed effects. TCAP analysis uses test scores for third to eighth graders. Models 9 and 10 add student characteristics, grade fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at the district level in Models 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8, and Panel A in Table 9 reports results for the screening analysis, and Panel B shows results for the signaling analysis. Panel A shows some positive evidence of screening in 2012 and (for the lowest cut score) in 2014. No coefficients in the pooled model are statistically significant, though the coefficient for the 160 cut score is just outside the 90% CI and is substantively meaningful, with scorers passing the screen rated approximately half a standard deviation higher than other assistant principals. Panel B shows some signaling evidence as well, with SLLA scores statistically positively correlated with TEAM ratings in 2 of 3 years and in the combined model. In the latter case, each 1 SD increase in SLLA score is associated with about 0.1 SD higher TEAM rating for assistant principals. Although not shown, results for models with district fixed effects generally are similar.
Principal Turnover Analysis
Our final analysis examines whether SLLA score is associated with principal turnover. We define principal turnover as the event that a principal leaves a district, exits the state education system, or takes a position other than principal. The logic behind this analysis is that even if SLLA scores do not reliably predict other job performance outcomes, the SLLA score still may be useful to school districts seeking to increase stability in the principal workforce if it helps identify which principals are more likely to stay in the district once hired.
We estimate three Cox proportional hazard models based on Equation 2 with SLLA scores entered different ways.
30 Table 10 reports the results with coefficients transformed into hazard ratios. None of the models show evidence that SLLA scores predict turnover.
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Discussion and Conclusions
As the demand for effective school leadership increases, state policymakers and district leaders need fair and accurate tools for identifying future effective leaders. Presumably, such tools could be used to help ensure that all new principals or assistant principals have a minimal level of competency-the goal of leadership licensure systems-or to assist with meeting key human capital needs, such as getting the most effective principals into the schools that need them most. We assess the potential for a widely used standardized leadership instrument, the SLLA, employed as a component of many states' administrator licensure systems, to provide leverage in screening less competent leadership candidates or signaling their future performance. A strength of the analysis is that we examine performance using multiple measures utilized for principal evaluation and accountability in Tennessee and other states. We also document differences in scores by the characteristics of leadership candidates and the schools they work in at the time they take the SLLA and whether candidates' SLLA scores are informative about their labor market outcomes, including the likelihood they are hired into an administrative position and, conditional on being hired, whether they stay in those positions.
We uncover two main results. First, nonWhite candidates perform systematically worse than their White counterparts on the SLLA, which translates into substantially higher failure rates. This result is similar to one observed for teacher licensure examinations (e.g., Anrig et al., 1986; Cole, 1986; Epstein, 2005; Gitomer et al., 1999; Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010) . This finding-that failure rates among non-White candidates are approximately three times as high as for their White colleagues-suggests that failure to obtain the required cut score may be an important barrier to increasing racial and ethnic diversity in a principal workforce that is overwhelmingly White. In Tennessee, as of 2013, non-Whites made up approximately 30% of the student enrollment but only about 20% of those in principal positions. Our results raise concerns that use of the SLLA as part of the principal licensure process may be inconsistent with leadership diversity goals. We also find evidence of other gaps in scores and failure rates by demographic characteristics, such as a relatively large gap between male and female test takers, but this gap likely is less concerning from a policy perspective because the group historically underrepresented in the principalship-women-are not the group disadvantaged by the test. Discrepancies in scores and passage rates across demographic groups may be justifiable if in fact the SLLA is successful at identifying competent or effective candidates for school leadership positions. We do find that high scorers are more likely to be hired as school leaders, which suggests that the SLLA is related to factors districts are looking for in principal selection, including, presumably, factors the district thinks are important for job performance. Our analysis of possible screening and signaling functions of the SLLA, however, calls into question the utility of the instrument for identification purposes. In our second main result, we find that, across a variety of job outcomes, numerous specifications, and different samples of principals by level of experience, neither surpassing the SLLA cut score nor obtaining a higher score on the exam serves as a useful predictor of future principal job performance in our samples. SLLA measures are rarely statistically positively associated with outcomes, and scores and outcomes are in fact more often negatively correlated, though in both cases the correlations typically are substantively unimportant. Although low statistical power in several of the screening models means that we cannot rule out the possibility that the SLLA indeed screens out principal candidates with meaningfully lower future job performance, the signaling models estimate relatively precise null (or negative) coefficients. In short, if the goal for the state or district is to license or select school leaders whose job performance will be high as measured by the indicators chosen as part of the state's own performance evaluation system, such as supervisor ratings or test score growth, or by low-stakes measures, such as teachers' survey assessments, the evidence here does not support the conclusion that SLLA scores are useful for meeting these objectives.
One caveat to these results is that we find some evidence that the SLLA might be useful as a screen or signal for assistant principal job performance. Although we only have one job performance measure for assistant principals in the data set, and the SLLA does not predict this outcome in every year, the results provide suggestive evidence of usefulness of the SLLA for this group that deserves further attention.
It is unclear why the SLLA fails to predict potential job performance measures for building principals. Perhaps the ISLLC standards on which they are based do not accurately specify the knowledge and skills required for successful building leadership. Perhaps they are the right standards, but the SLLA does not capture competency on these standards well. Perhaps the standards are correct and the SLLA is an adequate test of the standards, but simply knowing a principal's skills and knowledge prior to hire does not tell us much about how the principal enacts leadership in his or her school once in the job. In any of these cases, policymakers would need to take a hard look at continued usage of the SLLA as a condition of principal licensure.
Or perhaps the measures of job performance employed here, regardless of their relevance for principal evaluation, accountability, and other decision making, are not in fact reliable or valid performance measures. Measurement error in these variables would reduce the likelihood of finding a correlation with SLLA scores, even if the test was a good predictor of actual performance on the job. This criticism clearly is important for measures based on student test scores (Grissom et al., 2015) but may be relevant for other outcomes as well. If the null relationship between SLLA score and the other measures lies here, we should not be so quick to dismiss the usefulness of the instrument, particularly given evidence from the hiring analysis that districts may respond to the competencies the test measures in choosing new principals and assistant principals. That is, it could be that the SLLA helps districts identify school leaders who are prepared to be successful in areas of the work not captured well by the performance measures used in this study. In addition, we cannot be sure that patterns of sorting and unobserved heterogeneity in principal candidate quality across districts do not serve to attenuate the correlation between licensure scores and future outcomes. Also, for the screening analysis in particular, interpretation of the results is tempered not only by the aforementioned power concerns but by the potential for selection bias from the fact that we do not observe later performance outcomes for the lowest scoring test takers, though this number is relatively small given Tennessee's low cut score.
In other words, we might interpret the study's evidence as clear on the point that SLLA scores and passage rates differ by some key, policy-relevant principal candidate characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, and not in support of the idea that scores are useful for most screening or signaling purposes examined here, but with several caveats. States considering the utility of continued use of the SLLA in their licensure processes would need to weigh the apparent costs to the composition of the principal candidate pool against the possibility that additional research might uncover benefits of the assessment not observed here.
To this point, this line of research would benefit from replication of our results with other data sets in other states. Although we are advantaged by access to score histories for a large number of principals over roughly a 10-year time period and to a variety of job performance measures, our screening and signaling analyses are limited by the fact that some of these measures are only available for single years. Additional years of data or larger samples of principals may provide additional power. Adding years of data would also allow us to assess more fully whether scores on the more recent forms of the SLLA (1011/6011) have more power to predict later principal outcomes, an analysis limited in this study by the relatively small number of principal candidates taking these new versions who have to this point advanced to school leadership positions.
9. Standardized testing in high schools comes at the end of some courses only. We exclude these tests from the student growth analyses because it is unclear what prior-year score would be appropriate. Thus, nearly all high schools are excluded from these analyses, with the exception of the very small number whose grade span includes tested grades.
10. Items do not necessarily refer just to the performance of the school principal. For more information about Teaching, Empowering, Leading, and Learning (TELL), see http://www.telltennessee.org/ 11. In our original sample, 57% of the principals responded to the TELL leadership module. Forty-six percent of schools have TELL responses from at least one assistant principal. Almost all of the principals (97%) have responses from at least one teacher in their school (overall teacher response rate = 71%). We compared characteristics of principals and their schools between principals with and without TELL scores for each respondent type (i.e., by principal, assistant principal, and teacher) through a series of simple t tests. For TELL responses by principals, we found that principals with the scores tend to be female and White and work at schools with a smaller proportion of Black students in rural areas. For TELL responses by assistant principals, we found that principals with the scores are significantly different from those without the scores in many observable characteristics. For example, principals with the scores tend to be White and work at larger schools in less populated areas with a smaller proportion of disadvantaged students (note that only approximately 58% of schools in Tennessee employ at least one assistant principal in 2012-2013). On the other hand, for TELL responses by teachers, principals with and without the scores are comparable on most of the characteristics. Note that because surveys were anonymous within school, we do not have identifying information for respondents and thus could not compare characteristics of responding and nonresponding assistant principals and teachers.
12. Correlations in these school-level factor scores are 0.11 between principals and assistant principals, 0.17 between principals and teachers, and 0.26 between assistant principals and teachers.
13. Following the methodology proposed by Schweig (2013), we additionally used MPlus software to create factor scores that account for possible violations of measurement invariance at the school level. The correlation of the between-cluster factor scores and our original factor scores was 0.97; thus, we do not find practical differences between the multilevel and the single-level factor scores. These analyses were conducted using our original, single-level factors.
14. Models of test scores instead of test failures yielded similar results.
15. We also estimated logistic regression models and competing risk models (i.e., cumulative incidence functions) where becoming a principal is an event of interest and becoming an assistant principal is a competing event. We found similar patterns.
16. We also performed the same analysis using principals who took Form 1011 or 6011. These models were limited by sample sizes. For 2013 TEAM and TELL scores, we could estimate screening models for the 169 cut score only. For 2012 TEAM, 2014 TEAM, TEAM combined, and Tennessee ValueAdded Assessment System (TVAAS), we could estimate models for cut scores of 163 and 169. We found no evidence of a correlation between obtaining the cut scores and performance for any of these measures. For Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program (TCAP) scores, we found negative correlations in both math and reading when the cut score is 160 or 163. When the cut score is 169, we found a negative, marginally significant coefficient for reading but no significant coefficient for math. Results available upon request.
17. High school students are not included because they take end-of-course tests, which vary by grade.
18. We also ran TCAP models clustering standard errors at the student level. Student-level clustering produced smaller standard errors. We provide the more conservative standard errors in the main text.
19. This descriptive analysis includes one observation per test taker. Duplicates due to multiple test administrations are dropped.
20. There were also some changes in the personal and professional characteristics of the test takers between the two versions. Individuals who took the newer version are more likely to be female and White, and they tend to have less education but longer years of teaching experience. Given the pattern of correlations among these characteristics and test scores on the two test forms, it is unlikely that changes in the composition of the tested group explain the change in the distribution of scores.
21. The analysis treats multiple test scores for the same individual as independent. Although not reported, we also examined test scores and the proportion of test takers who failed for each test type and found similar patterns for Forms 1011 and 6011. Patterns for Form 1010 are trivial because of the very low rate of test failure.
22. We also ran versions of the models shown in Column 5 limiting the sample to principals completing preparation programs in Tennessee. The results were virtually identical.
23. In this analysis, the analytic sample includes principal candidates who are not in any school administrative position yet and those who already work as assistant principals. We narrowed the sample to the latter group of candidates and estimated competing risk models (i.e., cumulative incidence functions with becoming a principal as an event of interest and turnover as a competing risk) with different forms of the SLLA scores (results not reported). We found stronger evidence that SLLA scores predict future hiring as a school principal and that assistant principals with higher SLLA scores are much more likely to be hired as principals.
24. As a sensitivity check, we also estimated the screening models for 1011/6011. Although we could not estimate some models due to small sample sizes, we found no evidence of significant screening effects except in the TCAP models, which showed negative signs.
25. Likely because of the small number of test takers who fail to attain a score of 160, the confidence intervals (CIs) for the 160 cut score coefficients are particularly large.
26. The upper CI bounds for the 169 cut score estimates are systematically closer to 0 and in several cases do exclude substantively meaningful values.
27. In addition, we reestimated the main screening models for principals without prior experience as an assistant principal because of concerns that accumulating school leadership experience may mask the true screening effectiveness of the SLLA. Pooled results for TEAM, TCAP, and TELL teacher and principal responses are all similar to Table 6 . The 163 cut score is positive and significant for TVAAS; the others are nonsignificant though negative. The AP TELL rating is positively associated with the 160 cut score only.
28. We again combine test scores across all test types. As a sensitivity check, we estimated our models with test scores on SLLA 1010 only but found the same patterns. Because we observe outcome measures for so few principals with the other test types (i.e., 1011/6011), we did not estimate separate models with those scores.
29. Signaling results for principals with no AP experience are virtually identical to the results shown in Table 7. 30. These models are based on Form 1010. Sample sizes for Form 1011/6011 are very small in this analysis.
31. We also estimated the same models by redefining principal turnover as the event that a principal does not return to his/her school next year as a principal. We find no evidence that SLLA scores predict this type of turnover, either linearly or nonlinearly.
